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Abstract
Background: The 2009 H1N1 outbreak provides an opportunity to identify strengths and weaknesses of disease surveillance
and notification systems that have been implemented in the past decade.
Methods: Drawing on a systematic review of the scientific literature, official documents, websites, and news reports, we
constructed a timeline differentiating three kinds of events: (1) the emergence and spread of the pH1N1 virus, (2) local
health officials’ awareness and understanding of the outbreak, and (3) notifications about the events and their implications.
We then conducted a ‘‘critical event’’ analysis of the surveillance process to ascertain when health officials became aware of
the epidemiologic facts of the unfolding pandemic and whether advances in surveillance notification systems hastened
detection.
Results: This analysis revealed three critical events. First, medical personnel identified pH1N1in California children because
of an experimental surveillance program, leading to a novel viral strain being identified by CDC. Second, Mexican officials
recognized that unconnected outbreaks represented a single phenomenon. Finally, the identification of a pH1N1 outbreak
in a New York City high school was hastened by awareness of the emerging pandemic. Analysis of the timeline suggests
that at best the global response could have been about one week earlier (which would not have stopped spread to other
countries), and could have been much later.
Conclusions: This analysis shows that investments in global surveillance and notification systems made an important
difference in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. In particular, enhanced laboratory capacity in the U.S. and Canada led to earlier
detection and characterization of the 2009 H1N1. This includes enhanced capacity at the federal, state, and local levels in
the U.S., as well as a trilateral agreement enabling collaboration among U.S., Canada, and Mexico. In addition, improved
global notification systems contributed by helping health officials understand the relevance and importance of their own
information.
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Introduction
In the past decade, many new advanced systems for disease
surveillance and notification have been developed and imple-
mented throughout the world [1]. These generally fall into two
categories. Indicator-based surveillance systems gather and analyze
original data, especially those indicative of emerging health
problems in the population [2]. Recent advances include
enhancements of traditional case reporting and laboratory
capabilities, as well as the development and implementation of
‘‘syndromic surveillance’’ systems that collect and analyze
statistical data on health trends – such as symptoms reported by
people seeking care in emergency departments or other health
care settings – or even sales of prescription or over the counter flu
medicines or web searches [3]. Notification systems, on the other
hand, provide a means for communicating about the evidence that
emerges from indicator-based surveillance systems in order to
better understand the implications of local results and to enable a
global response if warranted. Notification systems in large part
stem from the adoption and implementation of the International
Health Regulations (IHR) and include efforts such as the Global
Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), ProMED Mail,
HealthMap, Argus, and Veratect (described below), which search
the Internet and other sources to identify disease outbreaks that
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might not have been apparent to health officials. These systems,
also known as ‘‘event-based surveillance’’ [2], have the potential to
detect outbreaks based on indirect evidence of illness not reported
to local health officials.
The outbreak of a novel strain of A(H1N1) influenza virus, A/
California/7/2009, now referred to as pH1N1, provides an
opportunity to see how well these systems functioned in practice as
an integrated public health surveillance system. The epidemiology
of pH1N1 has been well described elsewhere [4–6], and adding to
this understanding is not the goal of this paper. Rather, taking
advantage of this opportunity, the primary objective is to identify
the strengths and weaknesses of current global disease surveillance
and notification systems in order to improve their performance in
the future. Specifically, we ask whether and how advances in
global surveillance and notification systems put in place in the last
decade made a difference in the public health response to the 2009
H1N1 pandemic. We also identify the policy implications of the
findings for future enhancements to global surveillance and
notification systems, as well as for how preparedness should be
assessed.
As a secondary objective, this analysis illustrates the use of
‘‘critical event analysis,’’ part of the toolkit for systematic quality
improvement (QI), a perspective called for in the U.S. National
Health Security Strategy [7]. Emphasizing processes (chains of
events that produce specific outcomes) and systems of people and
information, the QI approach refers to a range of specific practices
including procedures and system changes based on their effects on
measurable outcomes, reducing unnecessary variability in out-
comes while preserving system differences that are critical to the
specific environment, continuous improvement rather than
onetime initiatives, and critical event/failure mode analysis. The
NHSS Implementation Guide further calls for the development,
refinement, and wide-spread implementation of QI tools. In
particular, this includes ‘‘efforts to collect data on performance
measures from real incidents … analyze performance data to
identify gaps, [and] recommend and apply programs to mitigate
those gaps’’ [8].
Data and Methods
This analysis is an in-depth case study drawing on information
from a systematic review of the scientific literature, official
documents, websites, and news reports. In particular, we
constructed a time line (Figure 1) in which three kinds of events
are represented and distinguished by a color code (to be explained
below): (1) the emergence and spread of pandemic H1N1 virus
itself, (2) local health officials’ awareness and understanding of the
emerging outbreak, and (3) notifications about and global health
officials’ awareness of the events and their implications. The
primary sources for this analysis were a timeline published by
ScienceInsider, an on-line publication associated with Science
magazine [9], other scientific and lay publications as indicated
in the text, as well as two of the authors’ contemporaneous notes.
In a number of cases the sources differed, so we used our judgment
to see which fit best with the other time points. This uncertainty is
represented in the text with phrases such as ‘‘In early April …’’.
With the events classified in this way, we then conducted a
‘‘critical event analysis’’ focused on the surveillance process rather
than the epidemiologic facts. Specifically, we first identified critical
events, incidents that advanced the recognition of what we now
know as a global pandemic. These events are points in time when
the public health system might have responded sooner or later
than it did, depending on the system’s capabilities. We then tried
to identify the factors that allowed the events to occur when they
did, rather than earlier or later, as in a root cause analysis. In
particular, we asked (1) when health officials in Mexico, the United
States, and at the global level became aware of the epidemiologic
facts of the unfolding pandemic, (2) whether an earlier recognition
could have been possible, (3) whether advances in surveillance
notification systems seem likely to have hastened the detection of
the outbreak, and (4) whether there are further improvements that
might be possible through enhanced practices, procedures, or new
systems. We sought to analyze decisions based on the information
that was available, or could have been available, to the decision-
makers at the time. Because illustrating the strengths and
weaknesses of this approach is one of our objectives, we discuss
the challenges, limitations, and opportunities presented by this
approach in detail in the conclusions section.
Results
The Mexican Outbreak
The exact location of the first human cases of pH1N1 infection
is not known, however retrospective analyses have identified cases
dating back to February and March, 2009 in at least three
locations throughout Mexico, as indicated by the text in light green
background in Figure 1. The earliest confirmed cases occurred on
February 24 in the state of San Luis Potosı́ in central Mexico [10]
and the first confirmed case in Mexico City had its onset on March
11 [11]. There was also an outbreak of influenza-like illness in pre-
school children in the State of Tlaxcala in central Mexico starting
on March 5 [12]. Starting on March 15, a major respiratory
disease outbreak occurred in La Gloria in the state of Veracruz.
This outbreak was originally attributed to a large pig farm on the
outskirts of town, but when three children became seriously ill in
late March and early April, health authorities in Veracruz began
to suspect an atypical influenza [9,13]. Consistent with PAHO/
WHO recommendations at the time, surveillance was conducted
using use immunofluorescence (IFI), which has low sensitivity in
practice. In addition, Mexico’s Institute for Epidemiologic
Diagnosis and Reference (InDRE) used real-time polymerase
chain reaction (rT-qPCR) for molecular diagnosis, but of course
probes for the pandemic strain were not available until afterwards,
so pandemic was not recognized at this time.
On March 27 a 39-year-old woman with newly onset diabetes
mellitus in Oaxaca developed severe respiratory illness and
eventually died of this illness on April 13 [14]. In addition, an
excess amount of influenza-like illness was experienced in the
Distrito Federal (Mexico City) in mid-March [9]. By mid-April,
Mexican national health authorities were aware of these and other
respiratory illness outbreaks throughout the country through the
National Surveillance System SINAVE (Sistema Nacional de
Vigilancia Epidemiologica). This system receives weekly reports on
117 notifiable conditions from nearly all of the more than 19,000
hospitals, clinics and doctors’ offices in Mexico and also monitors
520 sentinel influenza surveillance units covering all 32 states [15].
On March 13, the Mexican Directorate General of Epidemi-
ology had issued an alert about the outbreak of influenza-like
illness in pre-school children in the previous week in Tlaxcala
[12](the Mexican public health system’s awareness of the outbreak and
response is represented by dark green background in Figure 1). On April 6, a
local news story reported that 60% of La Gloria residents were
infected, with three deaths [13]. The following day, the InDRE
identified an influenza A viral strain that was unsubtypable (i.e. a
different strain than those known to be circulating at that time) in a
sample from La Gloria. InDRE had previously identified
unsubtypable samples from Mexico City, San Luis Potosı́, and
Baja California. By April 14, SINAVE was aware that there had
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been an increase in the number of cases and outbreaks of seasonal
influenza observed since February [12,16]. SINAVE was also
notified through both official and unofficial channels of cases of
severe laboratory-confirmed pneumonia, with high fatality, in
young previously healthy adults between the ages of 20 and 40
years in Mexico City and the States of México, Veracruz and San
Luis Potosı́ [9,17–19]. Active surveillance of Mexico City hospitals
starting on April 17 triggered by these reports found excess
demand for health services and high case fatality rate in
pneumonia cases [12].
The clinical and epidemiological characteristics of the cases that
had come to light by mid-April varied, and respiratory illness
during the winter could easily have been regarded as seasonal
influenza. Many of the cases were determined to have influenza B,
a trend that was also being observed in the United States [17]. But
a severe respiratory infection that, unlike seasonal influenza,
affected children and young adults together with prompts from the
World Health Organization (WHO) as discussed below, led the
Directorate General of Epidemiology to ‘‘connect the dots’’
between the outbreaks across the country by mid-April.
On April 15, Veracruz officials briefed the Directorate General
of Epidemiology regarding La Gloria outbreak investigation, with
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) officers in atten-
dance. Two days later, authorities conducted a press conference to
warn about atypical influenza season with increasing morbidity
trend and excess mortality. Following notification about the
emergence of novel H1N1 in the United States and interactions
with Canadian health officials and the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) as described below, Mexico
notified PAHO (the WHO regional office for the Americas) of a
potential atypical pneumonia outbreak on April 22, closed schools
in Mexico City on April 24 and throughout Mexico on April 28,
and did not open high schools and universities until May 7. On
May 1, non-essential government and private sector business
services were suspended. The number of confirmed cases peaked
shortly afterwards, but rebounded for a second peak in June and
July, by which time the entire country was affected [20].
The United States Outbreak
In late March, a 9-year old girl and a 10-year old boy in
southern California became ill with influenza (U.S. epidemiological
dates are represented by text with light blue background in Figure 1) [21]. An
experimental diagnostic device was being tested by the Naval
Health Research Center (NHRC) in San Diego requiring that
respiratory samples be collected and analyzed. On April 1, NHRC
found an unsubtypable influenza A virus in one of these samples
(the U.S. public health system’s awareness of the outbreak and response is
represented by text in dark blue background in Figure 1). By protocol,
respiratory samples were sent to the designated reference
laboratory, the Marshfield Clinic in Wisconsin, which on April
10 confirmed that the pathogen was influenza A virus, but could
not identify the strain any further. Also following protocol, a part
of the sample was sent to the Wisconsin State Laboratory of
Hygiene, which confirmed the finding on April 13 and forwarded
the sample to CDC for further analysis. On April 14, CDC
identified the subtype as H1N1 of swine origin, and on April 17
found swine influenza A (H1N1) virus in another specimen from
Naval Health Research Center in San Diego. Following a call with
California health officials on April 19, CDC issued an alert and
notified WHO on April 21 [9].
Between April 10 and 19, 14 students from a high school in
Queens, New York travelled to Mexico (all but one to Cancun)
during their Spring recess, and developed flu symptoms in the
week of April 19. On April 23, two days after the CDC alert, the
school nurse notified the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) that approximately 100 students
were being sent home with flu symptoms. DHMH notified CDC
that afternoon and began an investigation on April 24. The
following day, DHMH reported that most laboratory specimens
from these students tested positive by rt-PCR for influenza A with
no human H1 or H3 subtypes detected, indicating that the virus
was probably pH1N1. On April 29 CDC confirmed by rt-PCR
that most specimens were positive for pH1N1 [22].
On April 26, aware of the New York outbreak, as well as 20
cases from California and Texas, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) declared a public health emergency in the
United States [23], and on the following day, CDC issued ‘‘a
travel health warning recommending that United States travelers
postpone all non-essential travel to Mexico’’ [24]. About three
hundred schools in the US were closed by April 30 when the
accumulated pH1N1 cases were over 100 nationwide. An
immediate consequence was an increase in the number of U.S.
respiratory specimens sent for testing by the WHO and NREVSS
collaborating laboratories from 4219, of which 7.7% were
influenza-positive, in the week ending April 25 (week 16) to
14,330, of which 13.2% were influenza-positive, in the week
ending May 2 (week 17). The number of specimens, along with the
percent influenza-positive, peaked at 7844 and 41.9%, in the week
ending June 20 (week 24). By the end of the summer the first wave
had waned, but pH1N1 cases had been confirmed in every U.S.
continental state [25–27].
International Awareness and Global Spread
Health officials outside of Mexico were potentially aware of
what was eventually determined to be the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
as early as April 1, when HealthMap first disseminated local media
reports about a ‘‘mysterious’’ influenza-like illness in La Gloria
(global epidemiology and response represented in text with yellow shading in
Figure 1). The HealthMap system combines automated, around-
the-clock data collection and processing with expert review and
analysis to aggregate reports according to type of disease and
geographic location. HealthMap sifts through large volumes of
information on events, obtained from a broad range of online
sources in multiple languages, to provide a comprehensive view of
ongoing global disease activity through a publicly available Web
site [28]. Throughout the month of April, HealthMap also
identified informal local Spanish-language sources reporting on
the spread of the epidemic though Mexico.
On April 6, Veratect, a private firm based in Kirkland,
Washington that conducts disease surveillance, issued an alert
based on information from La Gloria and other sources of
"strange" outbreak of acute respiratory infection, which led to
bronchial pneumonia in some pediatric cases. This alert was
available to CDC, WHO, PAHO and several US city and state
public health officials that subscribe to Veratect’s service, and
records indicate that PAHO accessed it on April 9 and 10 (Wilson,
personal communication, December 3, 2009).
Figure 1. Timeline of H1N1 events. Note: Numbers in parentheses correspond to manuscript page where the event is described. Epidemiological
events are indicated in light shades (green for Mexico and blue for the United States), local awareness and understanding of these events in dark
shades (green for Mexico and blue for the United States), and global notifications and awareness of these events in yellow.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059893.g001
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On April 10, GPHIN notified WHO of acute respiratory illness
in La Gloria [28], and on the following day the PAHO IHR focal
point (the point of contact with the WHO under the IHR)
requested verification. On Sunday, April 12, Mexico’s director
general of epidemiology, Hugo López-Gatell, who served as the
Mexican IHR focal point, confirmed the existence of acute
respiratory infections, but said the initial epidemiological investi-
gation produced no evidence of a link to fecal contamination of pig
farms [9]. Dr. López-Gatell considered this outbreak to be a
potential ‘‘public health emergency of international concern"
(PHEIC) because it met IHR criteria (severe public health impact
and an unusual event) and provided a detailed report to PAHO.
On April 13, based on a tri-lateral collaboration agreement, this
communication was shared with the IHR focal points for the U.S.
and Canada, and was discussed in a teleconference on April 16.
Concerned that this pattern was similar to SARS, WHO requested
verification [29], and Mexican authorities quickly responded that
‘‘lab tests had failed to find any connection to a SARS-like or even
a flu virus.’’ On April 17, Dr. López-Gatell sought information
from local officials about a cluster of cases of acute respiratory
illness in a hospital in Oaxaca and was told that there was no
cluster, but rather a single patient with diabetes with a severe case
of acute respiratory illness, presumably of viral origin [17]. The
same day, Mexico notified PAHO of this case, noting the
possibility that it could be related to the cases of novel H1N1 in
the United States.
On April 17, InDRE director Celia Alpuche contacted the
Canadian National Microbiology Laboratory (NML), part of the
Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), for help in dealing with
the situation that was developing. Dr. Alpuche knew NML’s
director, Frank Plummer, through the Global Health Security
Action Group and other international collaborations, and valued
his expertise dealing with SARS and other unknown pathogens. In
a teleconference the following day InDRE and NLM officials
concluded that the outbreak was likely to be a novel agent,
unrelated to influenza. Following a conference call between
Mexico, Canada, the United States, and PAHO, Mexican samples
were sent to NML and CDC, and on April 23, both labs identified
the viral subtype as the novel H1N1. This collaboration was
possible because of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of
North America (SPP), a trilateral agreement between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico launched in March 2005. The CDC
MMWR report on two California children confirmed with Swine
influenza A were posted on the ProMED website on April 21,
which was the first report regarding the novel H1N1 influenza
virus [30]. On April 24, ProMED also reported severe respiratory
illness clusters in Mexico and connected it with the U.S. cases [31].
Aware of the developments in Mexico and Canada, Veratect
attempted to contact CDC, California, and Texas officials on
April 16 and 17. On April 20, Veratect urgently attempted to
contact CDC. James Wilson, Veratect’s medical director, said in
December, 2009 that he had been more concerned about this
situation than any other in many years of surveillance work
(Wilson, personal communication, December 3. 2009). However
Dr. Wilson was quoted in the Washington Post on May 3, 2009 as
having said ‘‘I suspect this is probably a false alarm.’’
On April 22, Mexico’s IHR focal point alerted PAHO about an
unusual outbreak of atypical pneumonia in young adults and
indicated a probable relation of these events to the outbreak in La
Gloria [32]. On April 25, the Mexican epidemiological evidence,
together with the laboratory results confirming the pH1N1
subtype in both Mexican and U.S. cases, led the WHO to declare
a ‘‘Public Health Emergency of International Concern’’ [33].
Over the next few days, Canada, plus a number of countries in
Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific regions reported
suspected cases. Reflecting the rapid spread of the virus, the WHO
raised the global pandemic threat level from phase 3 to phase 4 on
April 27. By May 6, WHO had reported 1,893 confirmed cases in
23 countries. Since cases were identified in these countries so
shortly after reagents were available for testing, it is likely that the
virus was actually circulating days to weeks earlier.
Discussion
A/California/7/2009, now known as pH1N1, was circulating
in Mexico and the United States in March 2009 and perhaps
earlier. That it was a novel pathogen came to the world’s attention
in April because of three critical events: the recognition that
multiple apparently disparate disease outbreaks throughout
Mexico were connected, the identification of novel pH1N1 in
two California children and its subsequent connection to the
Mexican cases, and the recognition that an outbreak in New York
City was connected to the Mexican and California cases.
The first critical event was the identification of pH1N1 in two
California children through the NHRC’s surveillance research
program. Because the epidemiologic information suggested
human-to-human transmission, this triggered a series of events
involving three laboratories (the Marshfield Clinic, the Wisconsin
State Laboratory of Hygiene, and eventually the CDC, which
identified the pathogen). Although the first child became ill on
March 28, CDC did not identify pH1N1, a potential public health
emergency of international importance under the IHR, until the
second child was determined to also have pH1N1 on April 17,
three weeks later and five days after Mexico had notified a
potential PHEIC regarding the La Gloria outbreak. In retrospect,
one might ask whether this identification could have occurred
earlier. A review of the timing of the events suggests that it could
have, but only if health officials in California, Wisconsin, and the
CDC knew it was a novel pathogen, which of course they did not
know. To find two children with unsubtypable influenza at the end
of the flu season is not remarkable, and indeed it is only because of
the research being conducted at NHRC that these cases came to
light at all.
The second critical event (which actually started earlier than the
first) was the recognition that a number of disease outbreaks
throughout Mexico with apparently different epidemiological
characteristics represented a single phenomenon and thus were a
potential public health event of international concern. Health
authorities in Veracruz and Tlaxcala were aware of outbreaks with
an unusual high frequency of severe pneumonia in otherwise
healthy young people in March, and in the week of April 5
national authorities came to realize that the outbreaks were
related, resulting in the first international alert on Sunday, April
12. However it was not recognized that the responsible pathogen
was pH1N1 until April 23, two days after CDC identified the new
virus strain and published its alert about pH1N1 in the California
children. Two labs in Canada and the United States were able to
test samples from Mexico and determine that pH1N1 was the
pathogen quickly, in only two days.
Although the samples were sent earlier than the established
protocol in response to Mexican authorities growing concerns, one
might ask whether samples could or should have been sent for
testing earlier. As indicated in Figure 1, during the week of April
12, which happened to begin on Easter Sunday coincidentally
included a visit of President Obama to Mexico City, CDC was
identifying pH1N1 in the first two cases and Mexican authorities
were conferring with PAHO and their North American counter-
parts about the situation. Although GPHIN, HealthMap,
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Veratect, and GPHIN had been issuing alerts about events in
Mexico for more than a week, no one seems to have connected the
outbreaks in Mexico and the United States until early in the week
of April 19. Had that connection been made earlier it is possible
that WHO could have declared a ‘‘Public Health Emergency of
International Concern’’ before Saturday April 25. Mexican, U.S.,
Canadian officials held a trilateral teleconference on April 16, but
U.S. participants did not mention the isolation of novel pH1N1
about which they alerted PAHO one day later. Given the
uncertainties and the concern that both Mexican and American
health officials must have had about the situation in their own
countries during the week of April 12, it is understandable that
they did not make the connection. Only in retrospect did it
become clear that each had the key to the other’s epidemiologic
puzzle.
The final critical event was the recognition, on April 24, of an
outbreak of pH1N1 in New York City high school students who
had travelled to Cancun, Mexico during their Easter recess the
previous week. This recognition, only days after the first student
became ill, was possible because a school nurse and New York
City health officials were aware of pH1N1 and the Mexican
situation through alerts and the news media earlier in the week of
April 19. Although the New York Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene would have definitely investigated an event of this
magnitude, knowledge of the CDC and Mexican alerts a few days
earlier added urgency to the situation (Fine, personal communi-
cation, Feb. 5, 2011). This in turn contributed to understanding
the outbreak’s epidemiology and presumably helped trigger the
declaration of a health emergency in the United States on April 26
as well as the WHO’s alert the previous day. Since the report was
filed immediately after the students became ill, and immediately
acted upon, it seems unlikely that this could have happened any
earlier.
In retrospect, considering the chain of critical events, if the
California samples been tested with more urgency in the week of
April 5 rather than April 12 and the results reported to Mexican
authorities earlier, it seems possible that global alerts about
pH1N1 could have been advanced by about one week to April 18.
By this time, however, the virus had spread throughout Mexico
and the United States, especially because of Easter travel. So even
with the earliest possible recognition of the emerging pandemic, it
seems unlikely that world-wide spread could have been contained.
And of course what now seems clear in retrospect was far from
clear in April, 2009. Indeed, coming at the end of the normal flu
season, no single Mexican or American surveillance finding was
exceptional, so without the international communication that
occurred in 2009 the pandemic could have taken longer to detect
and to characterize than it did.
Although it is impossible to quantify the effect, it could have
taken much longer for the world to become aware that a new
pandemic subtype had emerged. One must only consider the years
of effort it took to identify and characterize HIV three decades
ago, and the resulting confusion [34]. Global recognition of the
emergence of SARS in 2003 five years earlier was delayed for
weeks despite some awareness of its effect in China [35]. In their
analysis of 281 WHO-verified non-endemic human infectious
disease outbreaks that occurred between 1996 and 2009, Chan
and colleagues found that the median time from outbreak start to
outbreak discovery decreased from 29.5 days in 1996 to 13.5 days
in 2009, and the median time from outbreak start to public
communication about the outbreak decreased from 40 days in
1996 to 19 days in 2009 [36]. Both the Mexican and the U.S.
responses compare favorably to these statistics, and our analysis of
the impact of notification systems is consistent with Chan and
colleagues’ hypothesis that the improvement was largely due to the
proliferation of Internet-based notification systems. Chan and
colleagues’ analysis, however, only addresses the recognition of
single outbreaks. Recognizing that the same pathogen was
responsible for outbreaks at various locations throughout Mexico
and in Southern California and New York City, and moreover
that the pathogen was a newly emerged viral subtype, is more
challenging. It is rare for subtypes to be identified so quickly
(Morens, personal communication, February 5, 2011), but
modifications in the protocol to assess the importance of non-
subtypable strains before its definitive confirmation may provide
opportunities for more timely responses.
Analysis of these critical events shows how global investments in
disease surveillance and notification, coupled with a heightened
awareness of pandemic influenza, contributed to an enhanced
public health response to pH1N1. First, enhanced laboratory
capacity in the United States and Canada led to earlier
identification and characterization of the novel H1N1 strain.
Among other things, this recognition triggered national and global
pandemic plans, PCR-based tests were quickly developed to aid in
surveillance and clinical decision-making, and a vaccine seed
strain was quickly developed that led to the development of
pandemic vaccine in time to be used during the second pandemic
wave in the Fall of 2009 (although not before that wave began), in
which the CDC had been taking a leading role. In particular, the
early detection was due in large part to the existence of an
experimental influenza surveillance system developed and operat-
ed by the U.S. Navy’s NHRC in Southern California, which
identified the first two cases. Laboratory response networks
initiated or enhanced in recent years were also critical because
they enabled the involvement of CDC and Canada’s NLM, which
had the capacity to recognize pH1N1 as novel. This includes the
collaboration among Mexico’s InDRE, the NLM, and the CDC
that was possible because of the Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America (SPP) agreement as well as protocols
and relationships that facilitated collaboration among the NHRC,
the Marshfield Clinic, the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene,
the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,
and the CDC.
Second, enhanced global notification systems led to earlier
detection and characterization of the outbreak by helping to
‘‘connect the dots between cases in California, Mexico, and New
York City.’’ Through SINAVE and other sources, Mexican
officials were aware, for instance, of a serious problem in the week
of April 12, but it was not until CDC’s publication regarding
pH1N1 in California the following week that they sent samples
and realized that the two outbreaks were the same. After the
pandemic and with the support of the US and Canada, Mexico
has also developed its own capabilities for rt-PCR testing
throughout the country, facilitating much faster diagnosis.
Similarly, without the awareness that the same virus that was
making children ill in California and circulating widely – and
seriously affecting young people – in Mexico, during the week of
April 19, the school nurse in Queens and New York City health
officials might not have taken the outbreak in students who had
travelled to Mexico the previous week as seriously. The
notification systems that contributed to these results include the
International Health Regulations, voluntary reporting systems
such as ProMED, as well as active searching activities GPHIN,
HealthMap, Argus, and Veratect. In addition, some have
speculated that countries’ awareness that outbreaks within their
borders will soon come to light through these channels, increases
the likelihood that they will report themselves [37].
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The early events in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic thus illustrate the
important contribution of the 2005 IHR and the paradigm shift
that accompanied it. This includes, the definition of a PHEIC as a
comprehensive and flexible representation of health hazards, the
algorithm for risk assessment (Annex 2 of the IHR), and the
existence of National Focal Points that can (and are mandated to)
communicate directly with the WHO rather than go through
diplomatic channels. In this experience, the IHR system was also
instrumental to speeding two-way communications between
Mexico and PAHO and between the US and PAHO. Similarly,
the North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic Influenza
(NAPAPI) facilitated communication among Mexican, U.S., and
Canadian health authorities. On the other hand, Mexico, Canada,
and the U.S. currently have no official protocols for sharing
information from event-based surveillance sources such as
GPHIN, HealthMap and Veratect. The second edition of the
North American Plan for Animal (formerly Avian) and Pandemic
Influenza (NAPAPI), published in April 2012, seeks to develop a
more effective international sharing mechanism based on the
lessons from the 2009 pandemic.
Syndromic surveillance systems played an important role in
detecting the pH1N1outbreak, but a different the role that is
commonly used to justify them – that such systems can detect
outbreaks before conventional surveillance systems and enable a
rapid public health response [3]. Because pH1N1 emerged during
the normal flu season, there were too few cases to have been
detected by standard alerting algorithms. In the U.S., for instance,
the earliest appearance of the pandemic did not trigger a
quantitative alert in any syndromic surveillance system, although
four of the earliest cases presented at providers who were members
of CDC’s ILINet and so were tested and flagged for attention [38].
In Mexico, however, general acute respiratory illness with no lab
diagnosis is a notifiable condition. A sharp increase in such reports
to SINAVE in early April, along with an analysis indicating an
atypical age-distribution [19], helped Mexican officials realize that
the problem they were seeing was widespread, and led authorities
to conduct active surveillance for severe pneumonia starting on
April 17 and eventually influenza-like illness (ILI) in patients
visiting primary healthcare units and hospitals as well as influenza-
related deaths [6].
Conclusions
An analysis of this sort is clearly limited in two important
respects. First, since public health experts in the midst of puzzling
out the facts of a disease outbreak rarely take notes – indeed it is
often not clear until days or weeks into an outbreak that there is
anything worth recording – any retrospective analysis is subject to
recall bias colored by the epidemiological data and explanations
that eventually emerged [39]. For instance, facts and events that
might not have seemed important in isolation at the time take on
added significance after the fact if they fit the epidemiological story
that was eventually constructed. Second, it is impossible to know
what would have occurred in counter-factual circumstances – if,
for example, a certain surveillance system had not existed. For
instance, the fact that by 2009 the world was four to five years into
a period of enhanced concern about pandemic influenza means
that even in the absence of any concrete surveillance and
notification enhancements, it is likely that the public health
response was better than what might have been expected before
the avian influenza outbreak that started in Hong Kong in 1997
and the SARS outbreak in 2003.
Despite these limitations, a systematic analysis of three critical
events that occurred during March and April 2009– identification
of pH1N1 in samples from two children from California, the
recognition that multiple apparently disparate disease outbreaks
throughout Mexico represented a single phenomenon related to
the California cases, and the recognition that an outbreak of
influenza in New York City high school students were part of the
same picture – shows that both enhanced laboratory-based
surveillance, coupled with improved global notification systems,
did seem to have improved the global public health response to
pH1N1. The surveillance enhancements that made this possible
include an experimental influenza surveillance system operated by
the NHRC in Southern California as well as laboratory response
networks linking Mexico’s InDRE, Canada’s NLM, and the CDC,
as well as private and public health laboratories in the United
States. The global notification systems that contributed to these
results include formal and informal channels as well as activities
such as GPHIN, HealthMap, ProMED Mail, Argus, and Veratect,
which actively search the Internet for evidence of disease
outbreaks. At the national level, starting in May, 2008, Mexican
authorities held a weekly meeting, named ‘‘Epidemiologic Pulse,’’
to scan and assess epidemiological events in Mexico and the world.
This session played a key role in integrating the information from
formal and informal sources that emerged nearly a year later.
PAHO officials attended the April 15 session at which the La
Gloria situation was discussed. The trilateral teleconference the
following day was enabled by the North American Plan for Avian
and Pandemic Influenza (NAPAPI), a non-legally-binding agree-
ment prepared under the Security and Prosperity Partnership of
North America treaty. Since most of this did not exist a decade
earlier, is seems likely that the investments in building these
systems, together with a heightened awareness of pandemic
influenza, enabled a more rapid and effective global public health
response to H1N1.
Considering the chain of critical events, it is possible that global
alerts about pH1N1 could have been advanced by about one week
to April 18. But since the virus had already spread throughout
Mexico and the United States and elsewhere by this time, it seems
unlikely that this would have made a difference in containing the
world-wide spread of the virus. Rather, recognizing that there are
many false positives in epidemiology, and what now seems clear in
retrospect was far from clear in April, 2009, the picture that
emerges from this analysis is a global public health system, and
particularly public health agencies in Mexico, Canada, and the
United States, that worked together effectively to solve a
challenging epidemiologic puzzle in a reasonably timely fashion.
This analysis also illustrates the challenges of early detection and
characterization in public health emergencies. First, although in
retrospect the events described in this analysis clearly add up to tell
the story of the emergence of a new pandemic viral subtype, many
of the events – even large numbers of respiratory illness cases at
the end of the winter flu season – taken in isolation were not
sufficient to cause alarm. Given the number of such ‘‘signals’’ that
truly are isolated events, it is not useful or appropriate for local,
national, or international public health agencies to react with
alarm on every such occasion. Second, as with most novel
pathogens, the emergence of pH1N1 was characterized by
uncertainty that took weeks to months to resolve. Many
emergency preparedness professionals, however, still think in
terms of single cases triggering a response in hours or at most days
and this thinking is reflected in such key public health
preparedness documents as CDC’s 2011 Public Health Preparedness
Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning [40].
Epidemiologists familiar with the emergence of novel pathogens
rightly compare the rapidly evolving facts and scientific knowledge
to the ‘‘fog of war,’’ [41], and the United Kingdom’s Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness Programme has shown how it should be
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factored into public health preparedness planning [42]. Similarly,
recognition that it may take time to understand and characterize
an emerging threat has important implications for implementation
of the International Health Regulations, which define a ‘‘public
health event of international importance’’ (PHIEC) through a flow
chart [37,43] that implicitly presumes a bright line between a
PHIEC and other outbreaks.
More broadly, this recognition means that it is important to
expect and plan for uncertainty in preparing for the emergence of
a new pathogen. This requires attention to response capabilities in
addition to preparedness capacities. For instance, CDC’s and the
Trust for America’s Health’s most recent state-by-state assessments
of public health preparedness focus on ensuring that state and
local public health laboratories can respond rapidly, identify or
rule out particular known biological agents, and have the
workforce and surge capacity to process large numbers of samples
during an emergency [44,45]. Although such capabilities seem
necessary for some events they are not sufficient, and none of these
measures would have ensured that the public health system could
have identified the emergence of and characterized pH1N1 as well
and as efficiently as it was done in Mexico and the United States in
April 2009. Rather, the surveillance system capabilities that were
most essential were the availability of laboratory networks capable
of identifying a novel pathogen, notification systems that made
health officials aware of the epidemiological facts emerging from
numerous locations in at least two countries, and the intelligence
necessary to ‘‘connect the dots’’ and understand their implications.
Finally, this analysis illustrates the potential of the critical events
approach for collecting, analyzing, and understanding the policy
implications of data from real incidents on public health system’
emergency response capabilities. There are three critical compo-
nents of this approach; each requires knowledge of public health
systems and professional judgment.
First, the analyst must prepare a timeline describing key events
in both the epidemiology and the public health response, such as
the one in Figure 1. This can be a challenge because, as noted
above, early events are not in and of themselves seen as
noteworthy and are typically not recorded as they occur. Situation
reports that are now routinely prepared by emergency response
organizations can be helpful, but are typically not started until
there is an indication of a problem. For instance CDC did not
activate its Emergency Operations Center for pH1N1 until April
22, 2009, which was more than a month after the outbreak began
in Mexico. Alternatively, it would be useful to retrospectively
record the officials’ knowledge and understanding of events as
soon as possible after it becomes clear that a public health
emergency is underway.
Second, based on this timeline, one must identify the critical
events. These are events of more complexity than the recognition
of a cluster of cases, but less than the emergence of a new
pathogen. They represent opportunities when the response might
have occurred sooner or later than it did, depending on the public
health system’s capabilities. This is comparable, in a standard root
cause analysis (RCA) to the choke points in the process map when
errors occur. For this analysis, for instance, we choose incidents
that advanced the recognition of, and enabled a response to, the
global pandemic. Identifying these events was challenging, but the
creation and careful of a timeline was an essential first step.
Finally, the analyst must identify the factors that allowed the
events to occur when they did, rather than earlier or later. In a
standard RCA, these are the ‘‘root causes.’’ This requires
knowledge of how public health systems are supposed to perform
and the factors that can degrade this performance. It is also useful
to consider what might have happened had the critical events
turned out differently, an approach that March and colleagues
describe as ‘‘simulating experience’’ [46].
Learning about public health systems’ emergency response
capabilities is challenging because actual events are unique, and
both the epidemiological facts and the context varies from one
community to another. In other words, there is no replication, a
centerpiece of the scientific method. In this context, our analysis of
the global public health system’s ability to detect the pH1N1
pandemic gains rigor not by statistical analysis of repeated events
but rather by a detailed analysis of the timing of events in Mexico,
the United States, and the rest of the world. The kind of analysis
described here is far more extensive and probing than is
commonly seen in the After Action Reports (AARs) prepared by
health departments after exercises or actual events [47], and
illustrates the potential of the critical events approach for learning
about public health system’ emergency response capabilities from
real incidents that the NHSS Implementation Guide calls for [8].
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